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Abstract
A critical aspect of open systems such as the Internet is the interactions amongst the
component agents of the system. Often this interaction is organised around social principles,
in that one agent may request the help of another, and in turn may make a commitment to
assist another when requested. In this paper we investigate two measures of the social re-
sponsibility of an agent known as reliability and helpfulness. Intuitively, reliability measures
how good an agent is at keeping its commitments, and helpfulness measures how willing an
agent is to make a commitment, when requested for help. We discuss these notions in the
context of FIPA protocols. It is important to note that these measures are dependent only
on the messages exchanged between the agents, and do not make any assumptions about the
internal organisation of the agents. This means that these measures are both applicable to
any variety of software agent, and externally verifiable, i.e. able to be calculated by anyone
with access to the messages exchanged.
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1 Introduction
Open environments such as the Internet pose new challenges for software systems because of
their dynamic nature and the heterogeneity of entities in them. Agent-based systems are becom-
ing increasingly important for the development of applications in such environments because
of their ability to cope with uncertainty and to adapt their behaviour to constantly changing
conditions.
A critical aspect of the development of such systems is the manner in which agents co-
operate. In order to organise interactions between autonomous agents in open systems, it is
common to utilise concepts such as trust [RHJ04] and commitment [YS01]. There have been a
number of papers written on various aspects of commitments [Sin91, YS01, FC02, FC04]. The
particular aspect of interest in this paper is social commitment, i.e. an undertaking given by one
agent to another (in contrast with the single-minded or open-minded commitment of [RG91],
which is concerned with how a single agent may come to change its goals). However, an agent
which makes a commitment to another must clearly reflect this in its own goals and internal
reasoning processes. In this paper we are mainly concerned with the behaviour of an agent
in dealing with its social commitments. Conceptually, a social commitment is an undertaking
given by one agent (the debtor) to another (the creditor) for which the main incentive to fulfil
the commitment is social pressure from the society of agents. In order to exert such pressure,
it is clearly necessary for the agent society as a whole to be able to make objective judgements
about the commitments of an agent and whether they have been kept or not. Accordingly, such
commitments must be observable by all agents; we ensure this by requiring that commitments
be established by an exchange of messages.1
With most agent systems, the behaviour of the environment is impossible to predict, and so
the only guarantee that an agent can give to another party is about its own actions; anything else
is beyond its control, particularly the actions of other agents. In addition, agents are assumed
to be self-interested and to work to maximise their own utility. Although such environments, by
their very nature, may appear to mitigate against any form of cooperative interaction, Jennings
and Campos[JC97] have shown that socially responsible agents can lead to both good system-
wide performance and good individual performance when they are placed in a social context.
Furthermore, a socially rational agent may take into account the effect of its actions on the
community as a whole, rather than just the effect on its own goals [HJ97]. The most common
form of interaction between agents is requesting help from other agents and responding to such
requests [ACR96].
The two concepts which we believe are critical to the success of such interactions are re-
liability and helpfulness. Reliability is a measure of the extent to which an agent keeps its
commitments, while helpfulness is a measure of the extent to which an agent is willing to make
commitments. When making decisions about interactions in an open environment, an agent
can use these characteristics to evaluate potential interaction partners (similar to the credibility
ratings used in on-line auction systems such as eBay). In our framework, these are based purely
on the agent’s previous history of interactions, and so the reliability and helpfulness of an agent
(i.e. the agent’s social responsibility) can be measured by observing the external interactions of
agents with each other. This provides a simple and objective means of evaluation for systems
used for elecronic trading, contract negotiation or composition of web services. As measure-
ments are made purely on information available to all agents, there is no scope for agents to
make unsubstantiated claims for their reliability. Note that we do not consider issues of identity
or intention; we assume that all agents in the system are identified, and act honestly. Establish-
1For the remainder of this paper, we will use commitment to mean social commitment unless indicated other-
wise.
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ing an agent’s identity and detecting subversive behaviour are topics of interest, but are outside
the scope of this paper.
Ideally, from the society viewpoint, an agent would be both maximally reliable and maxi-
mally helpful. However, concern about being very reliable may make an agent overly cautious
in responding to requests; an agent that never makes a commitment can never fail to fulfil its
commitments. On the other hand, a very helpful agent may take on too many commitments,
and then find that it is unable to fulfill them all, thus leading to low reliability. Both extreme
cases — agents that always make commitments, but seldom manage to keep them, or agents
that seldom or never make commitments — are useless in practice. Hence there will always be
a trade-off between reliability and helpfulness.
An important aspect of both of these measures are that they can be evaluated purely by
external means. We only need to know what requests are made to a given agent, and what com-
mitments it undertakes, both of which are given by messages exchanged between agents. This
means that our measures of reliability and helpfulness do not depend on the internal architec-
tures of the agents. We do assume, though, that there are some specified interaction protocols,
which allow an observer to determine when commitments are requested, made, fulfilled or bro-
ken. We also assume that the agents follow the specified protocols. In order to provide a point
of technical focus for examples of our techniques, we concentrate on the interaction protocols
specified by FIPA [fIPAFb], the agents standards body. However, our methods are not limited
to these protocols, provided that it is clear how to identify the contents of a message (and in
particular a message indicating acceptance of a commitment).
This property of external verification is the main point of difference between our work and
trust models [ARS+05, SS02]. Being based purely on the visible history of interaction, there is
no scope for third-party recommendations, nor for any inference based on social networks. In
other words, what we provide as an input to each agent’s internal reasoning process is a simple,
concrete and verifiable measure of reliability based on past history. Related notions such as
reputation provide more sophisticated mechanisms, but we believe that our approach provides
a simple platform on which sublter forms of inference can be based.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the concepts of
reliability and helpfulness, and in Section 3 we discuss how to measure these, including a
combined measure which we call responsibility. Section 4 discusses how these measurements
can be applied to the specific FIPA interaction protocols, and provides and algorithm suitable
for use in a FIPA compliant platform. Section 5 discusses the trade-offs between reliability and
helpfulness, and how an agent might reason about these. Section 6 discusses related work and
Section 7 summarizes our results and conclusions as well as indicating possibilities for further
work.
2 Defining Reliability and Helpfulness
Our conceptual point of departure is that of a society of agents. Each agent is assumed to be
self-interested, and able to pursue its own goals. However, an agent may request assistance
from another agent by sending a request message. This request can be either ignored, denied or
accepted by the other agent, and in the latter case we say the agent has made a commitment to
the first agent to perform the requested task (and thus the commitment has been established).
In this sense all commitments arise from messages exchanged between agents.
For example, in the Contract Net protocol [Smi80], the initiator agent will call for bids to
perform a certain task, select one or more winning bidders, and assign the task to the relevant
agent(s). Once the task is assigned to an agent making a bid, the bidding agent acquires a
commitment to perform the allotted task.
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In this paper we assume that once a commitment is made, one of three things happen:
• The debtor agent successfully completes the allocated task, and sends a message to the
creditor, indicating it has been successful2. In this case we say the commitment has been
fulfilled.
• The debtor agent fails to complete the allocated task, and sends a failure message to the
creditor. In this case we say the commitment has been broken.
• The creditor agent cancels the commitment by sending a cancel message to the debtor.
In this case we say the commitment has been cancelled.
Note that the third case above is the only way in which a commitment may be cancelled; in
particular, the debtor has no way to cancel a commitment. In practice, there is a fourth case
as well, in which the outcome is not yet known; we call such commitments pending. This point
is discussed further in the next section.
As we have discussed, a reliable agent is one which keeps the commitments it has made.
Ideally, we may wish to define an agent as reliable only when it fulfills every commitment that
it makes. However, in practice we cannot always expect this, as even the most reliable agent
may sometimes fail. Moreover, we want to be able to compare the relative reliabilities of agents
which fail to keep their commitments.
Accordingly, we define the reliability of an agent as the ratio of its fulfilled commitments to
its established commitments. Note that we consider this value undefined if there are no such
commitments.
Helpfulness is defined similarly, i.e. as the ratio of the commitments established to the
requests received. This value is also undefined if the agent does not receive any requests.
In some cases, it may be useful to measure not just the overall reliability and helpfulness
of an agent, but particular subsets of the overall interactions of the agent. For example, in the
Contract Net protocol, the manager agent may be less interested in the overall reliability of a
particular contractor than its reliability on tasks requested by the manager (which may reflect a
deliberate policy on the contractor’s part to prioritise tasks requested by the manager over other
requests). For this reason we distinguish between global reliability, (i.e. reliability measured on
all known interactions) and relative reliability (i.e. reliability measured on interactions only
with a particular group of creditors). Similar remarks apply to helpfulness.
3 Measuring Reliability and Helpfulness
3.1 Measuring Reliability
In the previous section we have established the general notion of reliability as the extent to
which an agent fulfills its commitments, while helpfulness is the extent to which an agent is
willing to make commitments. However, if we are to actually measure these characteristics
we must clarify a number of details. While the general principle is that we want the ratio of
fulfilled commitments to established commitments, we must also determine how to deal with
such things as cancelled commitments and pending commitments. If an agent is released from a
commitment by a cancellation, then this should not have any negative impact on the reliability
of that agent. However, it also shouldn’t be considered as a fulfilled commitment. This leads
us to the notion that it is not the ratio of fulfilled commitments to established commitments
2This message may contain results of the activity committed to, or may simply indicate successful completion.
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which is of interest, but rather the ratio of fulfilled commitments to what we will call valid
commitments, that is commitments which are made, and not cancelled.
At any point in time when we wish to assess the reliability of an agent, we will in essence
be looking at that agent’s reliability over some particular time period. It is likely that within
that time period some commitments will be pending - they will have been established, but
have neither been fulfilled nor broken. Using the ratio of fulfilled commitments to established
commitments assumes that all pending commitments will be broken; using the ratio of fulfilled
commitments plus pending commitments to established commitments assumes that all pending
commitments will be fulfilled. Neither is likely to be a fair assumption. It seems more reasonable
to “distribute” the pending commitments according to the current ratio of fulfilled commitments
to established commitments, thus using the previous history as a guide. Consequently we define
a notion of finalised commitments which are valid commitments which have been completed,
i.e. they have been either fulfilled or broken. Our reliability measure then can be given as:
Reliability(p) =


‖FulfilledComm(p)‖
‖FinalisedComm(p)‖
if‖FinalisedComm(p)‖ > 0
Undefined Otherwise
This definition is equivalent to the more complex formula, which assumes that pending
commitments are fulfilled or broken in the same proportion as the currently finalised commit-
ments. As finalised commitments are simply the sum of fulfilled and broken commitments, this
definition also has the advantage that it is not necessary to measure or track established or
cancelled commitments (although of course we can always determine the number of finalised
commmitments from the number of established and pending ones, if desired).
For example, consider an agent which has previously established 100 commitments, of which
82 were fulfilled, 13 broken and 5 cancelled, and which has 10 pending commitments. Thus we
have 110 established commitments (the 100 previously completed and the 10 pending), and 95
finalised commitments. Hence its reliability is 82/(82+13) = 86%. The more complex formula
mentioned above would give (82 + (82/95)*10)/(82+13+10) = (82 + 8.6)/105 = 86%. Note
that the first calculation does not require the number of pending commitments to be known;
only the fulfilled and broken ones, i.e. only those whose status will not change (unlike pending
commitments, whose final status may be any of fulfilled, broken or cancelled).
3.2 Measuring Helpfulness
As discussed above, helpfulness is a measure of the willingness of an agent to establish commit-
ments. As with reliability, there may also be pending situations (i.e. where an agent has not
yet replied to a request), and again it seems appropriate to distribute the pending outcomes
according to the agent’s previous history of responses. Consequently we define our helpfulness
measure using positive responses to requests, as a proportion of total responses to requests, i.e.
positive plus negative responses. The helpfulness measure is thus defined as:
Helpfulness(p) =


‖PositiveResponses(p)‖
‖TotalResponses(p)‖
if‖TotalResponses(p)‖ > 0
Undefined Otherwise
Alternatively we may wish to consider that in the situation of requests, and responses to
requests, there is likely to be little time delay, and therefore we are not concerned with any
distortion due to pending requests. In addition, it may often be the case that a failure to
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respond is in fact a negative response, or at least a failure to be helpful. In particular, an agent
that never sends a negative response will have a helpfulness rating of 100% even if it does not
take on many commitments. Consequently an alternative definition is:
Helpfulness(p) =


‖PositiveResponses(p)‖
‖TotalV alidRequests(p)‖
if‖TotalV alidRequests(p)‖¿0
Undefined Otherwise
The main difference here is the information required to evaluate each one. The first requires
only the outgoing messages of the given agent, (which, as above, the agent can manipulate if it
so chooses) whereas the second needs to also look at the incoming messages of the agent, and
hence is less prone to abuse at the cost of ignoring pending requests. Accordingly agents which
either do not give negative responses or tend to reply more slowly to requests than others will
tend to have lower helpfulness ratings, which seems appropriate.
It should be stressed that this particular measure of helpfulness is designed to be simple;
there are a variety of others, such as incorporating the average time to respond, which could
be used. More sophisticated measures will clearly provide a more informative picture, but at a
corresponding cost. As our main focus is on providing simple and verifiable measures, we do
not pursue more sophisticated measures in this paper.
With both of these measures, where there is no history, (i.e. the number of responses or
finalised commitments is zero), then the reliability or helpfulness measure is undefined. In an
implementation other decisions could be made when no specific information is available. For
example, a default value (either fixed, or dynamic, such as the current average for agents in the
system) could be assigned to agents without a history (such as a new agent being added).
Both these measures can readily be modified in the obvious way to provide a measure of
reliability/helpfullness with respect to a particular agent or group of agents.
3.3 Combining Reliability and Helpfulness
Measurements of helpfulness and reliability allow us to compare agents on one or other of these
characteristics. However, as has been noted previously, there is a tension between these two
characteristics, as, in a demanding environment, greater helpfulness is likely to lead to lower
reliability (when more tasks are taken on, there is a greater risk of conflict, or inadequate
resources). We would like to have a single score, incorporating both helpfulness and reliability,
on which we can compare agents.
We note that in many ways reliability and helpfulness exhibit the same kind of tension as that
between precision and recall, the basic measures for evaluating search strategies in information
retrieval [VR79]. In general, it is not possible to have perfect scores in both measures; better
performance on one measure tends to be associated with worse performance on the other.
Figure 1 illustrates this inverse relationship.
The inverse relationship between recall and precision has been well understood for several
decades [CMK66, RBJ89]. The notion of a harmonic mean, known as the F measure, has
been used to combine precision and recall to produce a single score on which systems can be
compared.
We define a similar F measure in our context as:
F =
2 ∗ Reliability ∗Helpfulness
Reliability +Helpfulness
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Figure 1: Helpfulness (hRatio) and reliability (hRatio) are inversely related.
We will call this combined measure responsibility, as it provides a measurement of the balance
between helpfulness and reliability.
An important property of this measure is that it requires a balance between the two com-
peting characteristics. Unlike a standard mean, it is not possible to compensate for a low value
on one aspect with a high value on another. For example, comparing scores of 90 and 10, with
50 and 50, each would have a mean of 50, but the former has an F value of 18 while the latter
has an F value of 50. Even a balanced score of 20 and 20 gives an improved F value of 20, as
compared to the imbalance of 90 and 10.
Figure 2 shows how the F measure varies as its component values vary.
A variant of the F measure, again used in Information Retrieval, is the “E measure” which
allows for differing weights to be placed on the two competing characteristics. We will call this
weighted responsibility and it is given as:
E =
(1 + β2) ∗ Reliability ∗ Helpfulness
β2 ∗Reliability + Helpfulness
where
• β = 1 gives equal weight to reliability and helpfulness (E=F)
• β > 1 gives greater weight to reliability
• β < 1 gives greater weight to helpfulness
Reliability and helpfulness are clearly distinct concepts which it can be useful to reason
about individually. For instance in some situations it may be preferable to be assured of high
reliability, and obtaining a sufficiently helpful agent to interact with is not an issue. In other
situations, where demand is high and it is critical to establish a commitment quickly, helpfulness
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Figure 2: Figure showing the value of F as its component values change
may well be a more critical issue. However it is certainly useful to have a measure which allows
us to compare agents across both these characteristics, in a simple but principled manner. The
E and F measures provide this ability.
4 Using FIPA to Measure Helpfulness and Reliability
As discussed above, a key feature of our approach is that the measurements of reliability and
helpfulness are determined by interactions between agents. In order for interactions to be the ba-
sis for measurement, it is necessary for there to be some level at which interactions can be noted
and categorised without being concerned about the specific details of the message being sent.
The FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents)3 Communicative Act Library [fIPAFa]
defines a set of message types (performatives) with specific semantics which allow us to cate-
gorise the type of an interaction in this way, without being concerned about the details of the
actual message.
Some performatives implicitly assume certain social commitments of sending/receiving agents.
Fornara and Colombetti have proposed a method for agent communication, where the mean-
ings of messages are expressed by the social notion of commitments [FC02]. They analyze the
evolution of social commitments and also give a formal semantics for Agent Communication
Language (ACL) messages based on social commitments. However their work differs from ours
in that their focus is on giving a commitment based semantics to ACLs, whereas our focus is
on using the concept of commitment to measure characteristics of an agent interacting within
3FIPA is the standards body for agent systems.
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a multi-agent system.
We have chosen to stay within the FIPA defined ACL, as it is widely used, and provides a
mechanism whereby our suggestions can be put to immediate use. We assume that all agents
properly follow the prescribed protocols. This assumption will of course be false whenever an
agent leaves the space (perhaps by having its server go down), without properly terminating all
protocols it is involved in. However our approach to essentially ignoring any pending interactions
(at least in the case of responsibility) mitigates against these effects.
Within FIPA protocols, an agent can always respond with a not-understood, informing
the other party that it did not understand what was communicated. This performative may
terminate the interaction and possibly violate any commitments established. An agent initiating
a request can also send a cancel at any stage, thus terminating any commitment established.
These features complicate the analysis and measurement of reliability and helpfulness in real
world situations. Note also that agents can be engaged in multiple protocols simultaneously.
The effect of the various kinds of exceptions that can occur, such as not-understood, cancel
and time-out, vary depending on where in the protocol they arise. Consequently it is necessary,
when measuring the helpfulness and reliability characteristics of specific agents, to track the
individual conversations that occur. As a result, it is no disadvantage to specify the reliability
and helpfulness semantics of particular performatives, within the context of specific protocols.
We have therefore analyzed the existing FIPA protocols to establish which performatives, in
which protocols, are relevant for identifying the interactions appropriate to measuring helpful-
ness and reliability. We examine each of the nine accepted standard FIPA protocols, (Brokering,
Contract Net, Iterated Contract Net, Propose, Query, Recruiting, Request, Request-when and
Subscribe). Various decisions could be made about how to interpret the different performatives
within each protocol. We examine a particular set of decisions to illuminate how the concepts
can be interpreted. As a result of this analysis we also make some recommendations regarding
well-structured protocols, with respect to measuring reliability and helpfulness. In Section 4.3
we also provide an algorithm for measuring reliability and helpfulness in some of the protocols.
4.1 Helpfulness Analysis within FIPA Protocols
The formula for Helpfulness was given previously in two alternative forms:
Helpfulness(p) =


‖PositiveResponses(p)‖
‖TotalResponses(p)‖
if ‖TotalResponses(p)‖ > 0
Undefined Otherwise
or
Helpfulness(p) =


‖PositiveResponses(p)‖
‖TotalV alidRequests(p)‖
if ‖TotalV alidRequests(p)‖ > 0
Undefined Otherwise
We must now consider how to observe PositiveResponses and either TotalResponses or
TotalValidRequests, within each of the FIPA protocols, depending on which version of the
helpfulness formula we choose to use.
We first examine how to interpret the notion of request within the various protocols. For
the Brokering, Query, Recruiting, Request, Request When and Subscribe protocols, this is quite
straightforward. The requests are simply the performatives proxy, query-if, query-ref, request,
request-when , and subscribe. However for the remaining protocols it is not so straightforward.
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For the Propose protocol the initiator is proposing to do something for the participant
without any request having happened. One possibility could be to count the propose as a
positive response, and also increment the number of requests, in order to maintain the balance.
The other option is to not cover the Propose protocol with respect to helpfulness.
For the Contract Net Protocols4, we choose to treat the cfp (call for proposal) as a request.
We could alternatively have taken the view that these protocols are not ones in which an agent
can demonstrate helpfulness.
However, as mentioned previously, we need to exclude in our measure of TotalValidRequests
any requests which are cancelled before they have been responded to, or requests which are
ill-formed and therefore not understood by the receiver.
Determining which performatives can be considered as positive responses seems relatively
straightforward once we have established what a request is. For example agree in the Brokering,
Query, Request, Request When and Subscribe protocols and proposal in the Contract Net proto-
cols5 are clearly Positive Responses. However the Query, Request, Request When and Subscribe
protocols do not necessarily require an agree message - the inform may just be sent directly.
Consequently when monitoring these protocols we must interpret either agree or inform (but
not both in a single conversation) as indicators of Positive Response. Alternatively we can mon-
itor Negative Responses and assume that Positive Responses are equal to Total Valid Requests
minus Negative Responses, for those protocols where the agree is optional.
4.2 Reliability Analysis within FIPA Protocols
The formula for measuring reliability was given as:
Reliability(p) =


‖FulfilledComm(p)‖
‖FinalisedComm‖
if ‖FinalisedComm(p)‖ > 0
Undefined Otherwise
For the Contract Net, Query and Request protocols commitments are normally finalised
with either an inform or a failure, representing fulfilled or broken commitments respectively.
Finalised commitments are thus simply the sum of the number of inform and failure messages.
The measurement expression requires that it is possible to determine when commitments
have been finalised. On analyzing the Brokering and Recruiting protocols we identify some po-
tential difficulties in establishing when commitment has been fulfilled. In both these protocols
the final steps of the protocol come not from the Broker or Recruiter which established the
commitment, but rather from one or more of the Participant agents engaged by the Broker
or Recruiter. One viewpoint on reliability would be to count the inform from the Recruiter
or Broker indicating that appropriate Participant agent(s) had been engaged as being the ap-
propriate fulfillment of the commitment. Alternatively one may wish to require the Broker or
Recruiter to engage Participant agents which are themselves reliable, and therefore not consider
the commitment as fulfilled until one or more Participant agents send an inform or reply-to with
the appropriate conversation id. In the Recruitment protocol this is further complicated by the
fact that both the inform and the reply-to may go to a designated third party. Nevertheless
these messages could be monitored using the conversation id. The simpler approach is simply
to consider the commitment fulfilled when suitable Participant agents have been engaged.
4This can also be applied to the Dutch and English Auction protocols, which have however not yet been
accepted as standard.
5Also applicable to the auction protocols.
9
In the Subscribe protocol, the commitment is to notify the subscriber whenever a relevant
change occurs. In this case broken commitments would be cases where relevant change occurred
but no notification was sent. Without access to information about the referenced object it is
impossible to know whether or not the agent is reliable in informing all necessary changes. It
is not possible for either a generic system monitor, or the agent who is the recipient of the
commitment, to ascertain whether there may be commitment failures. However, a simplifying
assumption is that when the first subscription is recieved (via an inform we can consider the
commitment to be fulfilled. Consequently we count the first inform in a subscription as evidence
of reliability.
A related issue is when the commitment made is actually a conditional commitment [YS01]
This case occurs in the Request When protocol, which requires an action when a certain condition
is true. Without access to both the content of the condition, and the world of the agent in
which it is to be evaluated, it is impossible to ascertain when the action committed to should
be performed, and thus when there is failed commitment.
This problem arises in any protocol where there is a condition attached, leading to a con-
ditional commitment. If such a commitment is not fulfilled, it is impossible to determine if it
is because of unreliability of the agent or because the preconditions of the commitment were
not satisfied. Consequently, in this work we assume that there are no conditions buried in the
content of messages. The Request When protocol is consequently excluded from consideration
with respect to reliability.
The Propose protocol has already been discussed as somewhat unusual in that there is no
request for assistance. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that when the Initiator sends the propose
it is making a commitment to do the proposed action if the Participant agrees. However, despite
the fact that in the description of the protocol it says “Completion of this IP with an accept-
proposal act would typically be followed by ... the return of a status response”, no such response
is required within the protocol. Without this it is impossible to ascertain whether the Initiator
who has established the commitment, has behaved reliably. Consequently we also exclude the
Propose protocol from consideration of reliability. It is suggested that in reviewing protocols
for standardisation it would be useful to consider the issue of observability of commitments
undertaken and their fulfillment. Addition of an inform or failure in the Propose protocol,
similar to other protocols would have enabled reliability to be observed.
We summarise our suggestions as to which messages to count in assessing helpfulness and
reliability in Table 1.
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FIPA Protocol Performatives for Helpfulness Performatives for Reliability
Request Positive Failed Fulfilled
Response commitmenta commitment
Brokeringb proxy agree failure inform
Contract Net cfp propose failure inform
Iterated Contract Net
Propose N/Ac propose N/Ad N/A
Query query-if agree failure inform
query-ref inform
Recruitinge proxy agree failure inform
Request request agree failure inform
inform
Request-when request agree N/Af N/A
inform
Subscribe request agree failure inform
inform
Table 1: Summarizing helpfulness and reliability in FIPA standard protocols
aFinalized commitments are the sum of Failed and Fulfilled Commitments.
bWe assume the option where the commitment is discharged once the proxy has been found.
cAssume an implicit request when propose observed.
dReliability cannot be measured in this protocol as no message is specified.
eWe assume the option where the commitment is discharged once the proxy has been found.
fReliability cannot be measured due to conditional commitment, and inability to observe the condition.
4.3 Algorithm
We describe here an algorithm which will enable a process with access to the interactions in
the system to calculate (global) reliability and helpfulness. Such a process could reasonably be
attached to the Agent Management System (AMS) of a FIPA platform.
An alternative would be to have all agents compute values for the agents that they interact
with, and then combine these values periodically, or whenever a global measure was required.
However this would require that all agents to have such capabilities, and also introduces trust-
worthiness issues and the extra complexities of measuring relative scores. For simplicity we
choose an algorithm which can be located in a central monitoring process. The measurement
of relative reliability and helpfulness would naturally be distributed.
In order to measure helpfulness we will use the number of Valid Requests of agent i (V Ri),
and the number of Positive Responses (PRi). Similarly we count the number of Established
Commitments (ECi) and Fulfilled Commitments (FCi) for measuring reliability.
In the FIPA protocols, a request is established whenever an agent initiates an interaction
protocol by sending one of the list of performatives including request, query-if, query-ref, request-
when, cfp, etc. This request will be valid unless the initiator sends a cancel performative
immediately or the receiver agent replies with not-understood. Thus the validity of a request
and the establishment of a commitment depend on the progression of the interaction protocol.
Hence we define a double-index array V Rij, in which V Rij is a boolean value indicating whether
a request received by agent i in the interaction protocol j is valid or not. Similar remarks
apply to PRij , ECij , FCij regarding accepted requests, established commitments and fulfilled
11
commitments respectively.
Note that there are three stages relevant to the calculation of helpfulness:
1. Either no request has been received or a request has been received and cancelled
2. A request has been received, but no response has been sent
3. A request has been received and a response (either positive or negative) has been sent
Once the third stage has been reached, it is then meaningful to calculate helpfulness.
Similarly, there are three stages relevant to the calculation of reliability:
1. Either no request has been received or a request has been received and cancelled
2. A request has been received, but no response has been sent
3. A request has been received and a positive response has been sent (and so a commitment
has been made).
Again, once the third stage has been reached, it is then meaningful to calculate relia-
bility. Hence we keep track of each of these values with the variables Consider Helpj and
Consider Relj , each of which is initially zero. Consider the FIPA Request Interaction Protocol
j. When an initiator sends a request performative, this will lead potentially to a valid request
and also to an established commitment, and so we set the two variables to 1. If the participant
replies with agree or refuse, we increment Consider Helpj . If the response is agree, then we also
increment Consider Relj. If the response is refuse, then we decrement Consider Relj (so that
Consider Relj is now 0). If the initiator sends a cancel performative, the we set Consider Helpj
to 0. Note that it is also possible for an agent to accept the request without sending agree to
the initiator; we accordingly set Consider Helpj and Consider Relj when an inform or failure
occurs.
We consider V Rij and ECij in the computation of V Ri and ECi only when Consider Helpj
and Consider Relj are greater than 1. We denote this by
∑
Consider Helpj>1
V Rij and
∑
Consider Relj>1
ECij
Figure 3 shows the algorithm to measure the helpfulness and reliability of all agents known
in the system for a given time interval. If a message has its receiver or its sender unknown in
the system, then the list of known agents is updated. The algorithm is based on the assumption
that the protocol in which each message was sent is known; otherwise, the message is simply
discarded.
Figure 4 shows how to set the variables in the particular case of FIPA Request Interaction
Protocol (this is used in place of the line “Set values for variables” above). Due to space
limitations, we do not depict this for all FIPA Interaction Protocols. The algorithm considers
the sequence of the interaction protocol and also the exceptions caused by cancel and not-
understood performatives.
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Data Structure:
i a counter, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
N the number of agents in the system
Agenti the name of agent of rank i
V Ri the number of valid requests received by Agenti
ARi the number of accepted requests for Agenti
ECi the number of commitments established with Agenti
FCi the number of commitments fulfilled by Agenti
j contains the Conversation ID of the protocol
V Rij is a request received by Agenti in protocol j valid or not
ARij is a request received by Agenti in protocol j accepted or not
ECij is a request received by Agenti in protocol j an established commitment or not
FCij is a commitment made by Agenti in protocol j fulfilled or not
Consider Helpj the stage of protocol j at which a valid request should be counted
Consider Relj the stage of protocol j at which an established commitment should be counted
Hi and Ri helpfulness and reliability of Agenti
Algorithm:
For each agent i
For each message
Extract protocol, j=conversation id, sender, receiver;
j ← conversation id;
If (protocol is null) Discard the message;
If (receiver or sender unknown in list of agents) Update Agenti, N;
Set V Rij , ARij , ECij , FCij , Consider Helpj, Consider Relj as appropriate for the protocol;
EndFor
V Ri ← ΣConsider Helpj>1V Rij ; ECi ← ΣConsider Relj>1ECij ;
ARi ← ΣjARij; FCi ← ΣjFCij;
Hi ← ARi/V Ri if V Ri > 0;
Ri ← FCi/ECi if ECi > 0;
EndFor
Figure 3: Measuring helpfulness and reliability.
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Setting Variables:
If (PERFORMATIVE = request AND RECEIVER = Agenti)
V Rij ← 1; ECij ← 1; Consider Helpj ← 1; Consider Relj ← 1;
If (PERFORMATIVE = agree AND SENDER = Agenti)
Consider Helpj ← 1; Consider Relj ← Consider Relj + 1;
If (PERFORMATIVE = refuse AND SENDER = Agenti)
ARij ← 0; ECij ← 0; Consider Helpj ← Consider Helpj + 1; Consider Relj ← 0;
If (PERFORMATIVE = failure AND SENDER = Agenti)
FCij ← 0; Consider Helpj ← Consider Helpj + 1; Consider Relj ← Consider Relj + 1;
If (PERFORMATIVE = inform AND SENDER = Agenti)
FCij ← 1; Consider Helpj ← Consider Helpj + 1; Consider Relj ← Consider Relj + 1;
If (PERFORMATIVE = not understood AND SENDER = Agenti)
V Rij ← 0;
If (PERFORMATIVE = not understood AND RECEIVER = Agenti)
ECij ← 0; Consider Helpj ← Consider Helpj + 1;
If (PERFORMATIVE = cancel AND RECEIVER = Agenti)
V Rij ← 0;
Figure 4: Measuring helpfulness and reliability in Request Interaction Protocol.
5 Reasoning About Reliability and Helpfulness
As discussed above, the previous analysis is based on externally measurable features of the
interaction between the agents. However, in order to determine whether to accept a requested
commitment or not, each agent needs to have some deliberative process, which may take into
account the agent’s current measurements of helpfulness and reliability.
As indicated previously there is an inherent conflict between being helpful and being reliable.
The more helpful an agent is in making commitments, the greater likelihood there is that its
ability and resources will not suffice and it will fail to live up to some of those commitments,
thus being unreliable.
An agent will need to have some strategy regarding what commitments it makes (i.e. how
helpful it is), and may also have some strategy regarding which commitments it should break in
the event it finds itself unable to meet all its commitments. These strategies may be more or less
“intelligent”. They may also be either fixed, or dynamic, changing as the environment changes.
In addition the agent may be self-aware and use this awareness to modify its strategies.
We outline briefly some ways in which the agent may reason about what to commit to, in
order to achieve high reliability and/or high helpfulness ratings, or a high combined rating.
Many more reasoning strategies can be defined, and the intent of this section is simply to
provide some insight into how an agent can reason about ways to achieve greater responsibility,
measured in the ways that we have defined.
5.1 Commitments according to capability
It has previously been argued by Padgham and Lambrix [PL00], in the context of a single agent
making internal commitments (i.e. deciding which goals to pursue), that it seems unreasonable
for an agent to commit itself to a goal that it is beyond its capability to achieve. For example it
does not make sense for an agent to commit to a goal to cause rain, as it has no mechanism to
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achieve this goal. It would seem reasonable to require a responsible agent to also be constrained
by its capabilities with regard to the social commitments which it makes.
However there is some disagreement in the literature as to how capability (or ability) should
be defined. Some authors (e.g. [Sin99, vdHvLM94]) argue that an agent should be regarded
as having the capability of achieving a goal only if there is a course of action available to the
agent in the current environment. Thus capability is linked to current opportunity, as well as to
general abilities. Padgham and Lambrix argue that adoption of goals should not be constrained
by current opportunity, and thus have a looser definition of capability, requiring only that the
agent has some knowledge of how to achieve the goal in some environmental situation. We refer
to the former notion as immediate capability and the latter as expected capability. Immediate
capability can be thought of as requiring that there be a a currently applicable plan (i.e. a plan
instance where the preconditions are currently true). Expected capability requires that there
is a plan in the plan library, which addresses the goal. More generally, expected capability can
include the ability of the agent to generate (or otherwise obtain) a plan which it expects to be
able to use.
In a conservative approach towards reliability we may wish to require that the agent makes
a commitment only if it has an immediate capability with regard to the request. An approach
which involves greater risk of being unable to fulfill the commitment, but which is more helpful,
would be to make commitments whenever there is an expected capability.
5.2 Conflicts with previous commitments
Another factor affecting the ability of an agent to fulfill its commitment is whether or not the
commitment conflicts with other commitments already made. For example an agent who is
already committed to providing a particular an on-line booking facility for a particular football
match with a specific quality of service may not be able to commit itself in a similar manner to
another event in the same time frame.
Conflicts in general are not easy to detect in a generic manner. Thangarajah et al. [TWPF02]
have done some work regarding detection and reasoning about resource conflicts, which are one
of the common sources of conflict. They describe several levels of conflict, based on both the
level of certainty that conflict will eventuate, and whether the conflict is limited to a specific
time period, or whether, if it eventuates, it is ongoing. If the resource causing the conflict is
reusable, then the conflict will resolve after one of the goals has finished using that resource.
If the resource is such that once used it is permanently gone, and two goals both need it, then
other methods are required to resolve the conflict.
By building on this or other work on conflict detection, it would be possible to have the
agent consider definite or potential conflicts when making its commitments. As with capability,
one can take either a more conservative or a more audacious approach towards conflicts under
consideration. An agent could refuse all commitments with any type of potential conflict, or
it could refuse only commitments resulting in certain conflict. The various options in between
can be identified from the details of the work by Thangarajah et al. [TWPF02].
5.3 Strategies based on environmental conditions
In a dynamic environment it may be appropriate for the agent to adjust its commitment strate-
gies depending on the characteristics of the environment. If there are relatively few requests, it
may make sense to make commits more freely, as the opportunity to be helpful does not often
arise. Conversely, when there are many requests and the agent is unable to meet them all, it
may make sense to be more careful about commitments, perhaps taking a more conservative (or
cautious) approach towards capability and/or conflict. In addition, if the environment is quite
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demanding, it may make sense for an agent to refuse a very resource intensive request as this
would cause it to become unavailable for a period of time, thus reducing its ability to respond
to less intensive requests, and thus decreasing its helpfulness measure.
An agent that is able to monitor and reason about the relevant environmental factors could
choose its commitment strategy based on these, and would therefore behave differently in dif-
ferent domains. Such ability would also potentially allow the agent to switch strategies as the
environment changed, to better adapt to changing circumstances.
It is also possible that in different application domains there are different preferences re-
garding reliability and helpfulness. For example, reliability is more important than helpfulness
for the manager in a contract net protocol which is allocating specific tasks in building a house.
In contrast, in a call centre, an agent working at a reception desk would be expected to have
high helpfulness rating in dealing with all incoming calls.
These preferences could also affect the agent’s reasoning about its commitments, in order
to achieve the best behaviour for the specific domain.
5.4 Commitment with Self-awareness
An agent may also monitor its own behaviour in order to maintain reliability or helpfulness at
a particular level, or in order to balance both to achieve a better responsibility rating.
If an agent is monitoring its own reliability and helpfulness scores, it may, for example,
be cautious about making commitments (i.e. be less helpful), if its reliability is below a de-
sired threshold, (thus negatively impacting the combined responsibility measure). Similarly an
awareness that it has a lower helpfulness than reliability score may cause the agent to take more
risks in order to positively affect its helpfulness. Similarly, awareness of its own performance on
the combined responsibility measure could cause an agent to break a commitment to an already
accepted request if that commitment conflicts with several new requests which it believes it
would be more socially advantageous to accept.
This self awareness and its effect on the agent’s strategies, can of course be combined with
reasoning about environmental conditions. An agent that is able to change its strategy, based
on both environmental conditions, and on an awareness of its own behaviour, is likely to be
more successful in maintaining a high responsibility score.
6 Related Work
Our work has been inspired by related works in trust models [RHJ04, CF00]. In a multi-
agent society, an agent always needs to decide when, how, and with whom to interact. Trust
models, which normally gather knowledge about other agents, have been widely used in this
decision making process. In order to computationally model an agent’s trust in its opponents,
numerical ratings are usually used for characterizing different levels of performance. There are
different approaches regarding the retrieval and aggregation of ratings from different agents.
For example, Yu and Singh use referrals to retrieval ratings [YS00, YS02]. A social network and
corresponding techniques have been provided to gather information. Their initial work is based
on the assumption that all witnesses are totally trustworthy, which may not be realistic in all
circumstances. Hence, they proposed a model later for detecting deceptive agents in reputation
management [YS03]. Schillo et al. [SFR00] also challenge the ”‘benevolence assumption” above
by proposing a model to deal with lying witnesses. They have taken into account the probability
of lying witness in their algorithm for trust, which enables agents to autonomously deal with
deception and identify trustworthy parties in open systems.
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Sabater and Sierra [SS01] proposed a more realistic approach by using reputation value. The
reputation of an agent is determined by a combination of individual and group impressions.
They discussed how impressions are formed, recorded, and also used in both individual and
social dimensions.
In the domain of E-business, trust is used to build up reputations of members in a community.
For example, Ebay (www.ebay.com) asks buyers to give feedback ratings after each transaction.
Ratings from different buyers are summed together to get a seller’s customer service reputation.
Our work differs from the above model in that our trust model is built without requiring
ratings from other agents. The evaluation of an agent’s trust can be based on its helpfulness and
reliability, which both could be measured externally by counting and calculating the appearances
of specific performatives, which are used in agent interaction. There are no further requirements,
such as making agents responsible for giving ratings. To this end, our measure is an objective
one, based purely on monitoring the agents’ interaction and recording the number of relevant
performatives.
The simplicity of this approach can also be a limitation, as we assume that it is straight-
forward to determine the commitments between agents purely from the messages exchanged.
This will not apply to all protocols, particularly those in more homogeneous environments (as
there is more implicit understanding between agents). We also assume that all commitments
are unconditional, which greatly simplifies the determination of when a commitment is made.
Helpfulness and reliability highlight how socially responsible an agent is, and there has been
a lot of previous work on these concepts. One of the key outcomes of this paper is to link these
two concepts in a concrete way to the notion of social responsibility.
Social awareness is another aspect of social responsibility. A resource-bounded agent em-
bedded in a dynamic domain should not only be able to reason about the changes of the
environments on itself, but also be aware of the possible effects of its actions on the others in
order to gain the optimal long term benefits from its community. That is, social awareness
should be added into the individual autonomous agents to enable them to become more socially
responsible. It is important for agents to be concerned with not only their own individual
benefits but also those of society [JK95]. It has been shown by experiments that asking for
and giving help are the most successful interaction attitudes [ACR96]. Gauthier [Gau75] even
argues that individual utility maximisation destroys any real possibility of society. Helpfulness
characterizes that an agent honors its social role and tends to give help to the others in need.
However, with regard to giving help, Castelfranchi[Cas95] believes that an agent is not
rational if it always adopts other goals on request, where there is no benefit for the agent by
achieving the adopted goals. Newell also states the principle of rationality as “If the agent has
knowledge that one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select the
action.” [New82]. Hence, a “benevolent agent” or an “over-helpful agent”, which always adopts
other’s requests as its own goals, is irrational [Ld96, JC97]. In contrast to this black-and-white
approach, we have defined the helpfulness of an agent to be a value between 0 and 1 which is
based on measured realities whilst still allowing the agent to determine whether or not it will
be helpful.
Intelligent agents normally should have self-awareness and also awareness of its embedded
environment (at least partially). McCarthy gives a detailed discussion about what conscious
machines should have, and also some mechanisms for achieving this [McC95, McC04]. In our
work, this corresponds to an agent adjusting its behaviour according to its social responsibility
ranking, using its awareness of both the environment and itself as inputs.
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7 Conclusion
We have shown how social characteristics such as reliability and helpfulness can be measured in
an objective way, and how this can be used as a measure of social responsibility. In particular,
we have shown how approaches can use particular specifications such as the FIPA ACL and
Interaction Protocols.
This provides an initial attempt to measure in an objective manner, important social char-
acteristics. It was noted that some protocol definitions do not facilitate recognition of commit-
ments, and thus cannot be monitored for social characteristics based on such notions. However
relatively minor adjustments to the protocols would support such monitoring. A recommen-
dation from this work would be that an important characteristic to consider when defining
protocols, is the ability to monitor externally for an agent’s social behavior with regards to the
protocol.
We strongly believe that much of the value of a notion of social commitment lies in the
ability to observe the behaviour surrounding that commitment. One item of further work is to
perform some experimental validation of this approach, using a variety of protocols.
As mentioned above, one limitation of our work is that we assume that a commitment can
be determined purely by whether a particular message has been sent. For some more complex
protocols, or for conditional commitments, a deeper analysis of the interaction may be required,
such as tracking the status of conditional commitments through the execution of the protocol,
or searching through the execution sequence for a particular sequence of messages. Whilst such
extensions will complicate the issues of pending commitments, it will allow a greater range of
protocols to be used without abandoning the objective (and verifiable) measurement of reliability
and helpfulness.
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